TLR Wire

New Trends: Education and Party in Michigan

First, party: The University of Michigan collects data by political party only sporadically, so we don’t have a full history but, as we brought up at the time, last May, Richard Curtin, the guy who puts it all together, noted that in fifty years, the survey had never recorded as “dominant a political effect,” as it did in early 2017. Curtin expected that divergence to converge, but instead it widened.

Here’s the graph we ran:

During the years Trump has been President, Republican sentiment has averaged 117.6; while that of Democrats averaged 80, meaning Republican sentiment is running 46 points above the Obama years, while sentiment among Democrats is running just 13 points below. Both calculations exclude the depth of the recession years, when the divergence straitened to just 9 points; whoever thought we’d remember anything reassuring about those years.

That effect continues. In an October presentation Dr. Curtin identified his “major underlying issue,” as whether economic expectations surveys can retain their predictive ability given their “responsiveness to political rather than economic developments.” He quotes some observers who believe the partisan effect is “uniquely tied to the Trump administrations,” but his research suggests it is tied to our old friends income inequality and wage stagnation.

Second, educational attainment: Curtin also revisited the fact that the partisan divide between those with college-degrees remains “very low and insignificant,” and built on the striking observation he made back in May: the demographics really changed in 2017. Through 2016, generally, assessments of economic possibilities rose with income and education, and fell with age.

That changed in 2017.

Overall expectations for those with less than a high school degree had risen from 68 in October 2016 to 82 by August 2017, but fell for those with a college degree from 87 to 80. For those 65+ they rose from 2016’s 69 to 83 in 2017, while slipping a bit, to 86, for those 18 to 34 years old.
May 14, 2018
Sentiment for all three education terciles tracked each other closely throughout the series, all peaking around 2000, high school at 100 and the two college groups at 120, before falling raggedly to about 60 in the recession. The current divergence is led by an increase in the outlooks of the two lower attainment levels while those with a college degree are basically flat.

Curtin suggests that those with “relatively low job skills, as proxied by education, were the most affected by Trump’s election.” As we mentioned when we first brought this up, it’s a good thing if people with lower skills can do better.

But it’s a very bad thing if partisanship is putting a dent in the value of formerly trusted economic data.

by admin· · 0 comments · TLR Wire, Uncategorized

New Trends: Education and Party in Michigan

First, party: The University of Michigan collects data by political party only sporadically, so we don’t have a full history but, as we brought up at the time, last May, Richard Curtin, the guy who puts it all together, noted that in fifty years, the survey had never recorded as “dominant a political effect,” as it did in early 2017. Curtin expected that divergence to converge, but instead it widened.

Here’s the graph we ran:

During the years Trump has been President, Republican sentiment has averaged 117.6; while that of Democrats averaged 80, meaning Republican sentiment is running 46 points above the Obama years, while sentiment among Democrats is running just 13 points below. Both calculations exclude the depth of the recession years, when the divergence straitened to just 9 points; whoever thought we’d remember anything reassuring about those years.

That effect continues. In an October presentation Dr. Curtin identified his “major underlying issue,” as whether economic expectations surveys can retain their predictive ability given their “responsiveness to political rather than economic developments.” He quotes some observers who believe the partisan effect is “uniquely tied to the Trump administrations,” but his research suggests it is tied to our old friends income inequality and wage stagnation.

Second, educational attainment: Curtin also revisited the fact that the partisan divide between those with college-degrees remains “very low and insignificant,” and built on the striking observation he made back in May: the demographics really changed in 2017. Through 2016, generally, assessments of economic possibilities rose with income and education, and fell with age.

That changed in 2017.

Overall expectations for those with less than a high school degree had risen from 68 in October 2016 to 82 by August 2017, but fell for those with a college degree from 87 to 80. For those 65+ they rose from 2016’s 69 to 83 in 2017, while slipping a bit, to 86, for those 18 to 34 years old.

Sentiment for all three education terciles tracked each other closely throughout the series, all peaking around 2000, high school at 100 and the two college groups at 120, before falling raggedly to about 60 in the recession. The current divergence is led by an increase in the outlooks of the two lower attainment levels while those with a college degree are basically flat.

Curtin suggests that those with “relatively low job skills, as proxied by education, were the most affected by Trump’s election.” As we mentioned when we first brought this up, it’s a good thing if people with lower skills can do better.

But it’s a very bad thing if partisanship is putting a dent in the value of formerly trusted economic data.

by admin· · 0 comments · TLR Wire, Uncategorized

Fossil Fuels: $5 Trillion in International Subsidies

If anyone knows who took this photograph, please let us know.

We are honored that Cumberland Advisors picked up some work we did on climate change and the November California fires, and are happy to be seeing a change in the investment community’s thinking on the subject.

January 25th and California Fires

by admin· · 0 comments · TLR in the News, TLR Wire

Light truck detailing with an insider

In our mid-November report, we noted that auto-industry expert Kim Hill pointed out at a recent conference that automobiles’ share of total sales had dropped five percentage points over the year, and that the average price had risen 3% over that same period, because of light trucks. You can see that on the graph below, and also the, we’d say, shocking fact that light trucks were about 15% of total sales in 1970 and are close to 70% today. We’d like to give Kim a hat-tip for pointing out that within this trend auto jobs in nine states were at risk, with four plants in Michigan, six between the Great Lakes and the Gulf Coast in danger, and plants in California and Kansas possibly targeted.

As we heard from a small percentage of those plants, we picked up the phone, and Kim immediately cut to the chase, highlighting two trends. First, “One of the ugly parts of this industry transformation is that you have a bunch of older workers who just don’t have the skills they need for the future.” Them’s harsh terms about “cutting out dead wood,” so they can hire the tech-savvy younger workers, and we all agree that that is a public policy issue.
Kim says that General Motors has been looking at the plant in Ontario for a long time, and they are going to take some PR lumps for that because Canada and Ontario governments helped out GM during bankruptcy.

Here in the U.S. they are contractually obliged with unions to give long leads when they are closing plants, so don’t pencil these layoffs into your forecasts yet. Kim thought there would be more shuffling of workers, and was surprised to hear about the outright closings, although he knew the risk was there. He also suspects that the two plants being scrutinized, one in Ohio and one in Michigan, will be whipsawed against each other, and the states will get involved in a kind of bribing process with lots of money on the table. As sales of sedans “fall off the table,” these shifts to truck-style products will continue.

Auto manufacturing multipliers are always a subject for debate, if you go in for that kind of thing, and you could drive a SUV through the range here. The Bureau of Economic Analysis puts a 2.87 on the auto industry, meaning $1.87 in spending for every direct dollar, but Kim says there are big differences if you look at regions or the entire nation. Regionally he and his colleagues can tell “the minute they get off the freeway” if a plant is thriving or wilting. “In Fort Wayne there make a ton of pickup trucks and small businesses are thriving, but for the last 10 years in Lordstown there are more and more empty parking lots.”

The auto-industry’s rule of thumb is that you’re safe if you take a multiplier of 7, that means 6 jobs for every direct job, for the industry overall. On the state level, that may fall to 4 or 5 because you are not picking up work generated outside the limited region, and if you look at the national level you can get up to a 10 multiplier for assembly plants because then you are picking up all the small suppliers and service firms throughout the country.

Plants at risk include those in Lansing, Michigan, assembling Camaros and Cadillacs; in Lake, Orion assembling Sonic and Bolt; in Georgetown, Kentucky assembling all sedans; in Fairfax, Kansas, making Malibus; in Chattanooga assembling small utility vehicles—as well as the Alabama Hyundai plant, and the Mississippi Blue Springs/Tupelo Corolla plant. More to come and not as sweet as Tupelo honey.

Many have reported that tariffs are a driving force in these plant closings, but Kim isn’t so sure. He didn’t refute our suggestion that tariffs may have been a deciding factor in the decision to shift employees between plants and outright closings, but he said there is too much in flux: many assembly plants might be able to absorb a 10% tariff but would choke on a 25% tariff, and it’s impossible to expect anyone to make a “massive industrial decision” without that information. It’s also very hard for decision makers to deal with “whimsical buyers driven by fuel prices.” Customers can turn on a dime, but manufacturers can’t. We’ll be featuring intermittent interviews with Kim Hill, so expect one in a few months when the effects of tariffs become clearer.

by admin· · 0 comments · Employment & Productivity, TLR Wire

Measuring the Platform

The “platform economy”—Uber etc.—is a lot smaller than people think it is. And workers would pay good money for better working conditions.

A lot of myths circulate about the contemporary labor market. One of the more durable is that we’re all day laborers now, working two temp jobs and driving an Uber on the side. As we showed back in June, BLS stats show that between 1.3% and 3.8% of all workers are contingent, depending on which definition you use, which are smaller shares than what prevailed in 1995 and 2005. In other words, hardly representative.

But what about what the BLS calls “electronically mediated employment,” platforms like Uber and TaskRabbit? Internet and barstool chatter would have you believe they’re ubiquitous—not as a way of hailing a ride but as a major form of employment. Data released by the BLS at the end of September challenges this story. In fact, such platforms account for just 1% of total employment. And over a fifth, or 22%, of such workers are in the transportation sector, more than four times that sector’s share of total employment. Take those away, and the electronically mediated account for just 0.8% of employment.

There were technical challenges
to evaluating the numbers, which were gathered as part of a supplement to the monthly Current Population Survey (CPS, the source of the household employment stats) for May 2017. Many respondents were apparently confused by this question into thinking they should answer “yes” if they drove to work or used a computer on the job:

Some people find short, IN-PERSON tasks or jobs through companies that connect them directly with customers using a website or mobile app. These companies also coordinate payment for the service through the app or website.

For example, using your own car to drive people from one place to another, delivering something, or doing someone’s household tasks or errands.

Does this describe ANY work (you/NAME) did LAST WEEK?

Since the BLS could compare responses to this question with respondents’ full answers to the CPS, they were able to discover a large number of false positives. For example, a banker, a cop, a professor, a motel desk clerk, a hairdresser, and a surgeon all answered “yes,” even though they shouldn’t have. The raw “yes” responses came to 3.3% of employment. But when the BLS recoded the answers to be consistent with the regular CPS questions, the share fell to 1.0%. For transparency’s sake, they report both sets of results. But given the rich comparative data provided by the standard CPS questions, the recodings look well-founded.

As the graph above shows, there were some variations by demographics and especially sector in the prevalence of platform employment. There was little gender difference. Blacks were somewhat more likely than others to be so employed. The share rose with education (and, although the graph doesn’t show these results, those with advanced degrees were more likely than those with bachelor’s only to do electronically mediated work). The biggest variations are by industrial sector, with almost no one in the goods-producing sectors or government working for an app. But 4.5% of workers in transportation and warehousing, 2.7% of those in professional and business services, and 2.3% of those in information were.

These are not large numbers, even in transportation.
They’re consistent with a new study from the JP Morgan Chase Institute, which is based on deposits into 39 million Chase checking accounts. It found 1.6% of the sample earning platform income in 2018Q1, up from 0.3% five years earlier. (If you’re the sensationalizing sort, you could say the share has quintupled, but it’s still quite small.) Two-thirds of that came from transportation. Over the course of a year, 4.5% of accounts showed some platform income, but most were for just a few months.

Strikingly, despite the growth in platform work in transportation, from close to 0 in 2013 to 1.0% of the sample in 2018Q1, average monthly earnings in transportation were down by more than half, “even among the highest earning and the most regularly engaged drivers.” Earnings from selling (presumably names like Etsy and eBay, though neither the BLS nor Chase names names) and space rental (presumably Airbnb and the like) were quite small, with under 0.5% of accounts showing such income in a recent month. In months when families participate in the platform economy, such earnings account for just over half the month’s income—but other sources of income are clearly necessary.

So, it looks like the platform economy can provide some income, but not enough to live on. And the steady influx of drivers into the likes of Uber and Lyft is driving down pay.

by admin· · 0 comments · Employment & Productivity, TLR Wire