Articles by: admin

Non-Productive Poaching: It’s a Thing

Hat tip to Josh Lehner, of the Oregon Office of Economic Analysis, for suggesting we look at The Dual Beveridge Curve by Anton Cheremukhin and Paulina Restrepo-Echavarría, of the Dallas and St Louis Feds.

We’re outlining their research here, and strongly recommend you look at the graphs if you don’t have time to read through the paper. We were planning to take up a few other papers on the Great 3-Rs Debate—Resignation, Retirement and now Renegotiation—in this issue, but we’ll leave that for later to focus on this paper. It presents a very different way of considering the Beveridge Curve. To us it’s a real relief to have creative researchers getting into this instead of shrugging it off as a mystery, or building inaccurate narratives.

Some ads are looking for workers from the pool of the unemployed, others aim to poach employees. The two objectives target different skill sets, and have different effects on the labor market: a job shift has no effect on un- and employment rates, but a hire from the pool of unemployed workers does.

When the authors first call their view “extreme,” we thought, hey, it actually could just as easily be called highly logical. The extreme comes in because their “simple” model breaks the overall search and matching process into two non-overlapping processes: the two sets work in “separate, segmented” markets.

This departs from the usual practice that aggregates all workers, the employed and the unemployed, who may be searching for a job, with all vacancies, adds something new to the literature, and also contributes to the measurement of the searches of the employed.

In their underlying remarks they note that 99% of the unemployed spend some time actively looking for work, which is in line with the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ definition of being unemployed and with survey results, but that a far smaller share of the employed search for work. Using the Survey of Consumer Expectations and work by Jason Faberman they put that at about 22%. The employed are more efficient than the unemployed at finding work.

In their words, a “proper” Beveridge Curve should only include ads aimed at the unemployed. To do this, they break the Beveridge Curve out by sector, creating adjusted curves, which take the mystery out of the curve’s behavior. If you exclude the poaching ads, you end up with a very ordinary curve. (Please note they used the Household Survey adjusted to be like the Payroll Survey for this, not that other noisy thing.)

We snapped their graph (below), and you can see that the increase in poaching ads increased significantly in 2015. In their words, the curve shifted up at that time because of “a dramatic increase in non-productive poaching vacancies.” (We’ll say dramatic. That graph is as stunning as the openings rate was unbelievable to us.)

There was some drama in the most recent recession. Poaching vacancies dropped in 2020 and quickly recovered, but vacancies fishing for the unemployed rose in the recession, a time of social distancing, high unemployment, and decreased poaching. Spurred by measures to control the pandemic, more workers were laid off than could be explained by the fall in demand, and many were hired back quickly.

At this point, fiscal and monetary policy drove up demand, firms needed to expand, and that poaching reaccelerated. Supply bottlenecks and demand led to a surge in goods inflation, and poaching drove up wages. That’s what happened recently, and Cheremukhin and Restrepo-Echavarría are searching micro data to understand what drove the poaching surge in 2015.

Considering what will happen to unemployment, they note that in the 2000s ads designed to poach and those designed to draw were about the same, but now the majority of job openings target the employed. That would suggest the decline in openings might have an historically small effect on unemployment, and here they mention a soft landing.

But they add a caution. If mismeasurement is improving, then the Beveridge curve has shifted outwards, but the slope has not changed, and we don’t have the steepened curve required for the soft landing. Then a decrease in vacancies could drive an increase in the unemployment rate.

They also reference work done in 2013 showing that as of 2011, 42% of hires came from firms that did not report any openings. Alas, wider knowledge of that study might have saved us a lot of time spent squabbling over the openings rate.

Coda: Back in 2015, just as the yet-to-be-explained surge in poaching got underway we renamed, and in print, the openings rate the “Tire Kicker Rate,” on the belief that employers were just fishing, and raised many red flags that the openings rate was not doing well as an indicator, and it was likely driving faulty policy.

And that’s the sobering fact in this paper: The narrative was that unemployed workers were either too unskilled or too lazy to work. All the hullabaloo about job openings and the unemployed was misdirected. The companies were angling for workers already employed elsewhere, and the unemployed took the rap.

by admin· · 0 comments · Employment & Productivity

NCAs: Theory, meet data

Federal Trade Commission Chair Lina Khan has an opinion piece in the New York Times covering the FTC’s proposal to forbid the use of noncompete agreements (NCAs). We want to highlight new research presented in one of the papers she cites, “The Labor Market Effects of Legal Restrictions on Worker Mobility,” by Duke’s Matthew Johnson, Ohio State’s Kurt Lavetti, and Michael Lipsitz of the FTC. The paper makes many points, and references work on the rise of superstar firms, on domestic outsourcing, and on the weakening of unions as possible pressures causing the “downward acceleration” of labor’s share of income. Then they present their new work on gauging the effects of levels of NCA enforcement.

On the bright side, NCA could increase firms’ investment in training, knowledge that might increase workers’ productivity and earnings, but research suggests a darker pattern of depressed earnings instead. When we have written about NCAs pressure on wages and start-up formation in the past, some readers have suggested they are not a problem as they are not enforced. That is true, however, research suggests they are nonetheless threatening to workers who may not understand that, especially low-wage workers with lower educational attainment.

There are also cases of lawsuits involving stiff fines for low-wage violators, and the use of NCAs is growing. A recent study found that somewhere between 28 and 47% of private-sector workers are subject to NCAs. The authors referenced a 2014 “high-quality” study that put the share at 18%, noting the disparity may be explained by the passage of time.

Understanding how NCAs affect labor markets has proved “elusive,” and lack of comprehensive panel data has limited research on enforceability, leaving other potential but unobserved causes lurking. Johnson, Lavetti, and Lipsitz’s paper constructs a new panel that employs “within state changes” to isolate the effects of enforceability. They make the interesting point that the “vast majority” of changes in enforceability law come through judicial decisions, and suggest that’s a consequence of the importance of precedent in law in the courts. To them, judges are “more constrained than legislators in allowing economic or political trends to affect decisions.” They, tactfully, point out that was helpful in the design of their research.

13th-amend

Their research found that although, in their estimates, about 17% to 47% of the workforce is bound by NCAs, the effects extend beyond those workers. Negative externalities on wages including reduction of labor market churn, thinning labor markets, and higher recruitment costs. In studying markets that cross a state border, they found changes in enforceability in one state affected workers in the adjoining state. They cite the large body of literature showing that employed workers’ wages rise when their outside options improve, and that wages are more closely aligned with the minimum unemployment rate over the course of one’s job spell than to the rate when the spell began. Although they find this holds true on average, in states employing strictly enforceable NCAs the minimum unemployment rate has “essentially no effect” on the workers’ current wages, while the rate at the beginning of employment has a much stronger effect. In states with low enforceability, the effect of the longer run unemployment rate is “even more pronounced,” the start rate less.

They show NCAs extend inequality. Women are less likely to violate terms of their NCAs and more hesitate to commute, and strict enforceability reduces earnings of non-white and female workers by twice the reduction of white male workers’ wages.

They conclude that strict enforcement of NCAs ”fundamentally changes” wage negotiations, moving them from a model of implicit contracts and costless mobility, to one of implicit contracts and costly mobility. They find that by shutting down on-the-job wage growth, enforced NCAs deprive workers of a primary way to increase their incomes. By regressing the labor share of income at the state level using NCA enforceability, they find a jump from the 10th to the 90th enforcement percentile is associated with a 2.3pp decline in labor’s share of income. And that 2.3pp difference is about one-third of labor share’s decline over the last 80 years.

The FTA proposed rule is up for public comment, and Khan invites us, especially those directly involved, to weigh in to make sure their work is based in reality, not theory.

There is a lot of scholarship on this topic. Chair Khan doesn’t mention the link to former slave-holders following the Civil War—a tie shared with tipped employment—but that work is available two-clicks into the footnotes. Ayesha Bell Hardaway’s Paradox of the Right to Contract is a classic.

Instead dismissing NCAs because they are often not enforced, it might be more useful to wonder how our society came to tolerate repurposing a covenant designed to protect intellectual property to preventing a minimum wage worker from seeking higher wages at a different establishment. The personal damage caused by NCAs falls disproportionately on minorities and women, but the overall damage to productivity, new business formation, disruption and innovation, affects us all.

Philippa Dunne & Doug Henwood

by admin· · 0 comments · Comments & Context

The Trump Slump Reverses

As we’ve noted several times recently, US population growth has hit an all-time low, with preliminary estimates for 2022 showing 0% growth for the first time ever. But this new low has been years in the making. Over the last 10 years, US population growth was 5.6%—total, not an annual average. As recently as 2000, it was twice that.

One reason has been a sharp slowdown in immigration, shown in the graph below. Given the timing of the slowdown, which began in 2017, it’s hard not to trace its origins to the hostility to migrants expressed by former President Donald Trump. There were, after all, no economic reasons to explain the decline; the economy was still in the midst of a long expansion. And then covid hit in 2020, further reducing the number of fresh arrivals.

But, as the graph also shows, these trends look to have reversed: immigration rebounded this year to the highest level since 2017, according to a preliminary tally from the Census Bureau. This should be good news for an economy suffering from worker shortages. With boomers retiring at a rate above historical averages, and millions of younger workers still MIA, a revived flow of motivated new arrivals could be just what we needed. The numbers aren’t huge—just 0.3% of the population—but it’s good to see a turnaround.

—Philippa Dunne & Doug Henwood

by admin· · 0 comments · Comments & Context

Opening Gambits

There seems to be a consensus that the high level of job openings—September’s reading of 6.5% of employment is off from March’s all-time high of 7.3%, but it’s still at the 95th percentile of all months since December 2000—has contributed to inflationary pressures. We’ve long been skeptical about what the openings component of the JOLTS program measures, wondering whether it’s boosted by employers who say, “sure would like an app programmer for $10 an hour but I can’t find anyone!” And a lot of us wouldn’t mind being 35 again either.

We thought a look at recent state openings data might be clarifying. (We used three-month averages to smooth some of the volatility, which is greater at the state level than nationally.) It was clarifying all right: openings bear no relationship to wages.

That point is made by the maps below. The states are shaded so that high, medium, and low openings and high, medium, and low wage growth are represented by the same colors. If openings and wage growth were tightly correlated, the maps would look a lot more similar than they do.

Another way of making the same argument is with the scattergram below. Here too, there’s no relationship at all. The eye doesn’t want to add a trendline because there is none.

The lack-of-trendline point can also be made with a simple regression of average hourly earnings growth on openings. That yields an r2 of 0.02, meaning that the openings explain all of 2% of the variation in earnings growth. Worse, there’s a 15% chance that the relationship is entirely random. And the relationship is flattered by the two outliers (DC and Alaska, labeled in the scatter). Take them out and the r2 falls to 0.00 and the chance of randomness rises to 87%.

Aside from the fact that this has never looked like a wage-driven inflation, these opening stats explain nothing.

by admin· · 0 comments · Uncategorized

State university systems or collapsing bridges? Our choice

It’s been a while since we looked at net investment in the US, and we weren’t surprised to learn that the basic story hasn’t changed. Private investment is only a bit ahead of depreciation, and public investment even less so. So far in 2022, net fixed investment by the private sector has been 2.1% of GDP, which is also its average so far for the decade. As the graph on below shows, that’s about half what it was from the 1960s through the 1980s and is only slightly above what it was in the 1940s, the decade when civilian investment was squeezed to supply war needs:

Low levels of net private investment aren’t driven by declines in gross investment, which has been pretty stable. Instead, the major reasons for the decline are a shift towards shorter-lived equipment and the immateriality of intellectual property (IP) and a shift away from buildings. From 1950–1999, net fixed private investment averaged 32% of gross; since 2000, it’s averaged 20%—and 16% since 2020. Every asset category has seen that shift. Net equipment investment went from 24% of gross from 1950–1999 to 15% since 2020. Even nonresidential structures aren’t being built for the ages; they went from 49% of gross to 16%. (Are they just building self-storage units these days?) And IP isn’t what it used to be either; its net went from 23% of gross in the earlier period to 16% in the most recent.

Residential net investment isn’t doing too great either: it went from an average of 2.8% of GDP from 1950 to 1999 to 1.7% in the 2020s. Unlike the mid-2000s housing bubble, which took net residential investment up to 3.8%, the highest since the post-World War II decade, the latest bubble took net housing investment up to just 1.9% of GDP last year. It’s fallen back to 1.4% in 2022. That’s not the way to meet a housing deficit estimated by Freddie Mac at 3.8 million units.

For the public sector, the decline in net investment has been more dramatic, falling from around 2% of GDP in the early decades on the graph to 0.4% since 2020. (It’s 0.3% so far in 2022.) Like the private sector, we’ve seen a shift towards shorter-lived assets, but unlike the private sector, we’ve also seen a decline in gross investment, which fell by almost half between the 1960s and 2020s. Net federal civilian investment is just 0.1% of GDP so far this decade, a third its 1950–1999 average. State and local investment has fallen harder, down by almost three quarters from that 50-year average to 0.5% in the 2020s (0.3% so far this year).

The graphs below give a yearly view since 1950. They tell the same story: steady decline, with cyclical oscillations around the trend. The burst of net private investment in the late 1990s gave us a major productivity acceleration, but it was not to last. And the burst in civilian public investment from the early 1950s through the late 1960s gave us interstate highways, schools, and state university systems. The long declines in net investment, both private and public, have given us stagnant productivity growth and a collapsing infrastructure.

by admin· · 0 comments · Employment & Productivity