Articles by: admin

Oil and the Economy

In our reports, we have often made the point that the belief that shoppers spend their fuel savings on other sending is largely a myth—overall spending and spending on gas generally move together, and we tend to drive more when gas is cheaper. But just what is the relationship between oil prices and economic growth? Are high prices signs of economic strength or do they portend decline? Conversely, are low prices stimulative, or are they a sign of weakness? How do we separate cause and effect?

New York Fed economists Jan Groen and Patrick Russo have been on the case. The answer is basically—and unsurprisingly—“it’s complicated.” Groen and Russo develop a model, using what they describe as “a large number of financial variables,” to isolate supply and demand influences on the price of Brent crude since 1986. In a June 2015 post, they report that the price declines of the late 1980s and late 1990s were driven by supply-side shocks, namely aggressive expansion of production by OPEC members, notably Saudi Arabia. More recently, they find that the 2001–2001 and 2007–2009 declines were driven by demand shocks resulting from U.S. recessions. But outside these recessions, tighter supplies put upward pressure on prices through 2010. Between 2010 and 2012, prices were driven higher by a combination of rising demand and supply constraints. But since then, expanding supply has driven prices lower—a tendency that was partly counterbalanced at first by rising demand through mid-2014. Since then, demand has weakened while supply has remained plentiful.

And what are the effects of changes in oil prices? They find that price declines resulting from supply shocks have only modestly stimulative effects on GDP and consumption—roughly a +0.10–0.15% kick to both from a one-standard-deviation supply shock in the first quarter or two afterwards that decays in about four quarters. Real nonresidential fixed investment responds more strongly but more slowly, maxing out at about 0.30% three quarters after the shock. Investment takes a little longer to decay, but the effect is all gone in seven or eight quarters. Their model projected that the decline in oil prices of late 2014 and early 2015 would have only a modest stimulative effect during the second half of 2015, and would be mostly dissipated by early 2016. Given recent growth rates, that looks like not a bad forecast.

In a recent post, Groen and Russo updated their work. Their model suggests that the price declines in late 2015 and early 2016 have had and will have little effect this year. Perhaps, then, we all pay too much attention to oil prices.

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Telling it like it is in the Great Plains

We thought you all might like this comment on gas prices and overall spending from one of our tax contacts in the Great Plains:

I think of savings on gas as pre-spent money. Spending on gas is inelastic, and the average consumer saves about $1,500 a year [for every dollar drop in price]. For the working-class person that $1,500 may have already been spent. Now, instead of being $150 in the hole each month, they are only in for $25. That would explain why the $500 payment back in 2001 didn’t provide substantial gains, and why we didn’t see an increase in spending when gas prices halved.

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Federal Reserve’s LMCI Weakens Further

Recently we’ve been writing about the three-consecutive-month decline in the Fed’s Labor Market Conditions Index (LMCI), which is updated on the Monday after the employment report. The sluggish April report caused the LMCI to decline further, making it a four-month streak. The decline may not look like much on the graph on p. 7, but four-month running declines are rare outside recessions or the months immediately preceding them. There were such streaks during the “mid-cycle slowdowns” of 1985–1986 and 1995–1996, but those followed periods of Federal Reserve tightening. Otherwise, none.

LMCI

We suppose you could call the end of QE and the upward nudge in fed funds a tightening, but the central bank remains extraordinarily indulgent with little immediate prospect of a hostile turn. So count us slightly more troubled than we were the time time we wrote about this.

Real Estate Headwinds

As we’ve noted before, the end of QE is taking its toll on a variety of frothy markets—not just the unicorns in the Silicon Valley. The high-end condo market in Manhattan is cooling substantially; sales at the 1,004-foot tower known as One57 have stalled, with 20 of the 94 of the units still unsold, according to the Wall Street Journal. And One57 was a pioneer of the super-high-end segment; newcomers are finding it a rougher go. There’s no evidence—yet—that this slowdown is trickling down to more modest dwellings. There’s a massive construction boom underway in downtown Brooklyn and the neighboring “cultural district” around the Brooklyn Academy of Music, and a lesser one underway in Long Island City, Queens, both areas that were never known for luxury in the past. The transformation of both neighborhoods have been dreams of city planners since the late 1980s; it’s taken a few real estate cycles to get there. So far, demand has met supply, but if you walk around either area, you have to wonder how long their developers’ luck can hold out. During the mid-2000s housing boom, people seemed to forget that rising prices calls forth rising supply, which eventually puts an end to a bubble; will New Yorkers soon find out that the rules of the heartland apply to them as well?

But it’s not just the end of QE—there’s also the cooling in China and the end of the commodity boom, which is reducing the supply of restless capital looking for a home. A friend of TLR who does real estate banking in South Florida reports: “Construction lending is getting very tight, even for luxury condos in glamor markets. Russian, Latin and Mideast oligarch demand has evaporated, and the Chinese flight capital ain’t enough to bridge the gap. Likewise with hotels. Next shoe to drop is luxury rental market.”

In the Fed’s most recent survey of bank loan officers, there was a modest tightening of standards on commercial and industrial and commercial real estate loans—not as harsh as our Florida correspondent reports, but still a headwind for those sectors, though more a breeze than a gale. Standards on loans to households, by contrast, were modestly eased.

 

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The Dart Lands on 2%

How did that 2% inflation rate get sanctified? Neil Irwin of the New York Times once traced the origins of the totem back to Dan Brash, a former kiwi farmer who became governor of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand in 1988. Shortly after Brash took office, the NZ parliament mandated that the central bank pick an inflation target and granted it the political independence to meet it. Working with the nation’s finance minister David Caygill (successor to the legendary Roger Douglas, whose policy of aggressive market liberalization had worldwide influence), Brash settled on 2%. The idea spread to central bankers around the world.

Should there be such a target? The consensus of those who matter for such things seems to be yes, but one important dissenter was the current chair of the Fed, Janet Yellen. At FOMC meetings in 1995 and 1996, Yellen argued strongly against adopting a formal inflation target. In January 1995, she denounced a single-minded focus on inflation at the expense of real outcomes like employment and income growth. Underscoring the point, the said that “a wise and humane policy is occasionally to let inflation rise even when inflation is running above target.” Further, the costs of inflation targeting could be high: “Each percentage point reduction in inflation costs on the order of 4.4 percent of gross domestic product…and entails about 2.2 percentage-point-years of unemployment in excess of the natural rate.” For her, there was no proof that keeping inflation low improved economic performance, making those costs not worth paying.

She developed the point a year-and-a-half later, at the July 1996 meeting of the FOMC. She reiterated that very low inflation has no demonstrable economic benefit, other than perhaps reducing tax distortions, and those problems could be addressed legislatively without incurring the economic costs of disinflation. She also touted the flexibility afforded by slightly higher inflation: it made it easier for real interest rates to go negative when the economy needs stimulus, and it also disguised real wage cuts that might be necessary in response to demand shocks or to balance labor supply and demand across sectors. Of course, inflation in 1995 and 1996 was around 3%; she thought lowering that to 2% wouldn’t hurt much, but anything beyond that would be uselessly painful. But now even 2% might seem constraining with the ZLB having become a fact of life, and one that might endure.

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